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NOTES
BATTERED WOMEN SUING POLICE FOR FAILURE TO
INTERVENE: VIABLE LEGAL AVENUES AFTER
DESHANEY v. WINNEBAGO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Prior to the United States Supreme Court holding in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,1 a trend of domestic vi-

olence cases emerged in federal circuit and district courts 2 involving
battered women plaintiffs suing police and municipalities under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 3 These plaintiffs have achieved varying degrees of
success in attributing their injuries to police officers' customary failure to protect their constitutional rights under the equal protection
and due process clauses. 4 Collectively, these cases suggest that an
equal protection claim, although burdensome in requiring evidence
of discriminatory intent, may provide a more promising legal ave1 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
2 The Third Circuit noted this trend in Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't,
864 F.2d 1026, 1027, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan.,
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.
1988) (original opinion), amended & superseded, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Dudosh v.
City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reh'gdeniedsub nom., Dudosh v. Warg, 668
F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated&rem'd, Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 917
(unpublished opinion 3d Cir.), cert. denied, Dudosh v. Warg, 488 U.S. 942 (1988), reh'g
grantedin part, Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 722 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984)).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) [hereinafter section 1983]. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
4 See Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1033 (vacating order denying summary judgment on
equal protection claim and remanding for further proceedings); Watson, 857 F.2d at 698
(reversing order granting summary judgment to city and police officers on equal protection claim and remanding to district court); Balistreri,855 F.2d at 1428 (reversing district
court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's due process and equal protection claims);
Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 396 (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff's due process claim and denying same motion on equal protection claim, "except insofar as the plaintiff's claim against the City... is premised upon the 'inadequate
training' theory."); Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1531 (denying City's motion to dismiss
complaint for "failure to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right" and for "failure
to properly allege a 'custom' or 'policy' "). For a more detailed discussion of battered
women's constitutional claims, see infra text accompanying notes 67-103.
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nue for redress than a due process claim. 5 Specifically, uncertainties
surrounding the special relationship doctrine and the extent of a
state's affirmative obligation to protect individuals from domestic violence have led to inconsistent results in the courts' analyses of substantive due process claims. 6
In the analogous child abuse context, the DeShaney Court addressed the question of whether a state, through its officials and
governmental entities, has an affirmative constitutional duty under
the due process clause to protect a citizen from private violence. If
so, a state's failure to protect would render it liable under section
1983. The DeShaney Court held that "a State's failure to protect an
individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause."' 7 Further, the Court denied the
existence of a special relationship triggering the state's affirmative
duty to protect because the child victim was not in the state's
custody when his father abused him.8 In a footnote, however, the
Court signalled the viability of equal protection claims: "[t]he State
may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain
disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause." 9
DeShaney raises important questions regarding available legal
avenues for battered women. Are due process claims now foreclosed to these plaintiffs? How viable are equal protection claims
based on gender discrimination? Do state tort claims provide the
preferred avenue for damages resulting from police negligence and
inaction? This Note directly addresses these questions.
Part I of this Note discusses the relevant legal standards for
equal protection and due process violations, enforceable through
section 1983. Part II reviews a chronology of domestic violence
Regarding unpromising due process claims, one commentator noted:
Holding a state liable for its inaction in effect imposes upon it an affirmative duty of protection. Recognizing this, most courts have not imposed
affirmative duties on the states; they view the Constitution as, principally,
a 'charter of negative liberties' designed to prohibit certain state actions
rather than mandating them.
Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liabilityfor Failure to Act, 53 U. CH. L. REV.
1048 (1986) (authored by Lisa E. Heinzerling) (footnote omitted).
6 Compare Balistreri,855 F.2d at 1426 (finding a special relationship triggering duty
to "take reasonable measures to protect" the plaintiff from batterer-husband via restraining order and repeated police notification of abuse) with Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at
390 (refusing to find a special relationship based on the defendants' awareness of a special danger to battered woman-decedent from her murderer-boyfriend). See infra notes
29-30 and accompanying text. But see Balistreri, 901 F.2d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1990) (retracting finding of a special relationship in reponse to DeShaney).
7 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004.
8 Id. at 1004-06.
9 Id. at 1004 n.3.
5
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cases prior to DeShaney, and the DeShaney opinion itself. Finally, Part
III assesses the viability of legal avenues after DeShaney. This section
argues that: (1) battered women may still have a promising substantive due process avenue via a theory of liability that does not depend
on the special relationship doctrine; (2) the viability of equal protection claims alleging that police pursue policies discriminating
against battered women depends on the courts' willingness to infer
discriminatory intent from extreme disparate impact; and (3) courts
should provide battered women with a federal forum through consideration of pendent state tort claims.
I
DOCTRINAL STANDARDS:

SECTION

1983

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL DEPRIVATIONS

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides private
citizens with a federal remedy' 0 when state officials acting "under
color of state law"" deprive individuals of their constitutional
rights. 12 An important motive for the passage of section 1983 was
to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, enabling plaintiffs
to bypass state courts:
[O]ne reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might
3
be denied by the state agencies.'
To establish an actionable section 1983 claim, "a plaintiff must
show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right."' 14 In addition to state
officials, a municipality may be held liable as a "person" under sec10 The federal remedy may take the form of damage awards or equitable relief. See
supra note 3. Additionally, the Civil Rights' Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988, permits a "court in its discretion... [to] allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee" in section 1983 claims. STEPHEN G.
BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PoLIcY 1035 (2d
ed. 1985).
11 Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1029 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).
12 See supra note 3.
13 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (emphasis added); see also Dimarzo v.
Cahill, 575 F.2d 15, 18 n.3 (1st Cir.) ("mhe Civil Rights Acts of 1871 were intended to
safeguard constitutional rights which state authorities might deny by neglecting to enforce state statutes as well as by more affirmative action. Failure to act where there is a
duty to act can give rise to an actionable claim under section 1983") (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 927 (1978).
14 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Par-
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tion 1983 if it follows a "policy or custom" that results in constitutional deprivations to individuals. 15
In the domestic violence context, the viability of a battered woman's section 1983 claim turns on the second element-proving the
deprivation of a constitutional right. Although no constitutional
right to police protection exists on a general basis, courts have recognized two exceptions.' 6 First, under the due process clause, the
state owes a duty to protect an individual's liberty interests when a
special relationship exists between that individual and state
agents.1 7 Second, under the equal protection clause, the state may
not discriminate in providing protection to the public.18 Battered
women have used both exceptions, contending that police, through
inaction, have violated their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. 19 The United States Supreme Court has stressed
repeatedly, however, that the scope of section 1983 is not so broad
as to convert "every tort committed by a state actor into a constitu'20
tional violation."
ratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Rinker v. Napa County, 831 F.2d 829, 831 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
15 City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (1989); Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Regarding the meaning of "person"
under section 1983, the United States Supreme Court in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989), held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." The Court found that the defendants, the Department of State Police and the Director of State Police in his official
capacity, were not "persons" liable for damages (i.e., monetary relief) under section
1983. In a footnote, the Court qualified its holding: "[A] State official in his or her
official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 .... "
Id. at 2311 n. 10. In light of this holding, battered women seeking damages against police officials should sue them in their individual capacities.
16 See, e.g., Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699-700 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 284-85 (1980); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1987);
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)); Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665
F. Supp. 381, 388, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
17 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (finding special relationship between institutionalized mental patient and the state); cases cited supra note 16;

infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. Courts and commentators have not recognized general police protection as a property interest or property entitlement triggering
procedural due process protection. See cases cited supra note 16; see also Comment, supra
note 5, at 1069 & n.98. The petitioners in DeShaney, however, asserted a property entitlement claim to the state's protective services by virtue of state child protection statutes.
109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 n.2 (1989); see also infra note 126 and accompanying text. The
property entitlement theory in light of DeShaney is discussed and assessed as a possible
legal avenue for battered women in Part III of this Note. See infra notes 175-82 and

accompanying text.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3; Dudosh, 665 F. Supp. at 392.
See supra notes 2 & 4. For a more detailed discussion ofbattered women's constitutional claims, see infra text accompanying notes 67-103.
20
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007 ("Mhe [section 1983] claim here is based on the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, as we have said many times,
does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional viola18

19
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Due Process Violations in the Domestic Violence Context

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' 21 Battered women's substantive
due process claims under section 1983 typically allege a liberty deprivation resulting from the failure of police to intervene in domestic
assault situations. 22 Courts have acknowledged that an individual's
right to liberty may include the "right to personal security" 23 and
'24
the "right to be free from physical harm and restraint.
In this context, the special relationship doctrine, derived from
tort law, 2 5 may trigger the state's affirmative constitutional duty,
26
under the due process clause, to provide protective services.
Courts have been inconsistent in their consideration of the factors
that comprise special relationships. 27 Specific factors which courts
frequently, but not uniformly, consider include:
(1) whether the state created or assumed a custodial relationship
toward the plaintiff, (2) whether the state was aware of a specific
risk of harm to the plaintiff; (3) whether the state affirmatively
placed the plaintiff in a position of danger; or (4)whether the state
28
affirmatively committed itself to the protection of the plaintiff.

By emphasizing the second and fourth factors, a battered woman has argued successfully that a special relationship existed between her and the state by virtue of a court order of protection from
abuse and police notification of domestic violence. 29 The special retion.") (citations omitted); see also S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 10, at 738 ("Widespread invocation by litigants of § 1983 has led to concern, particularly within the
Supreme Court, that broad construction of § 1983 and of the rights it protects would
lead to significant intrusions by the federal judiciary on the autonomy of states.") (footnotes omitted).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22
See, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988).
23 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
24 Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1425 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-75
(1977)).
25
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984); Comment, supra note 5, at 1051.
26 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
27

See supra note 6; infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.

28

Balistreri, 855 F.2d at 1425 (citations omitted); see also Estate of Bailey v. County

of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 (3d Cir. 1985) (relevant factors include "whether the victim

or the perpetrator was in legal custody at the time of or prior to the incident; whether
the state had expressly stated its desire to provide affirmative protection to a particular
class or specific individuals; and whether the state knew of the victim's plight") (citing
Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194-95 n.lI (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052

(1985)).

29 The Ninth Circuit found that a "restraining order together with the defendants'
repeated notice of Balistreri's plight" established a special relationship. Balistreri, 855
F.2d at 1426 (original opinion), amended &superseded, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (find-
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lationship doctrine, however, has not always been helpful to bat30
tered women plaintiffs.
B. Equal Protection Violations in the Domestic Violence
Context
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that "[n]o State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 3 ' Battered women
bringing equal protection claims under section 1983 usually argue
that police differentiate between domestic violence calls and
nondomestic violence calls. This classification, they contend, results
in less protection to domestic violence victims than to nondomestic
victims. 32 Therefore, because women typically are the victims in domestic assaults, a police policy using this classification discriminates
33
against women.
Equal protection analysis of challenged classifications based on
gender discrimination involves two legal standards, depending
upon the type of classification involved. 34 First, if a classification
represents an explicit, purposefully gender-based discriminatory
policy, this policy must withstand an intermediate level of scrutiny
ing no special relationship in light of Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.). For a full discussion of DeShaney's impact, see infra
Part III.
30
See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 390-91 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
("We do not believe that such knowledge [of a special danger to decedent from her
boyfriend] ....by itself, can alone be a basis for a finding of a special relationship of a
constitutional nature.... [Tio hold otherwise would recognize the fear ...that § 1983
was becoming a federal tort claims act.").
31
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32
See cases cited supra note 2.
33
See cases cited supra note 2; see also Downum v. City of Wichita, Kan., 675 F. Supp.
1566, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986) ("It is well established that claims of sexual discrimination
are cognizable under the equal protection clause.... [Violations of that clause] reveal
some legislative or administrative scheme or state-promulgated policy which is subject
to [judicial] review.") (citations omitted); Note, Battered Women and the Equal Protection
Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 799 (1986)
(authored by Amy Eppler) (citing DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIvEs 14 (1st ed. 1976)

(showing statistics from several cities confirming that women predominate in the class of
domestic violence victims)).
34 See, e.g., McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 1989)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 727 (1990); see also Note, supra
note 33, at 793-98 (discussing two standards of proof of equal protection violations
based on gender discrimination in the domestic violence context). An alternative formulation of equal protection analysis of discriminatory classifications based on gender
views the requisite element of discriminatory intent as a precondition for invoking a
court's intermediate-level scrutiny to assess the classification's constitutionality. Either a
court finds that a blatantly gender-based classification shows the requisite discriminatory
intent, or the plaintiff proffers sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent when a classification is facially gender-neutral.
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to pass constitutional muster.3 5 Specifically, the government must
show that the challenged policy is substantially related3 6 to an important government objective or interest.3 7 Second, a policy may
contain a classification which is gender-neutral on its face but, as
applied and administered, discriminates against women.3 8 The gender-neutral standard requires that a plaintiff prove a discriminatory
intent or purpose for such a policy in order to invoke a court's inter-

mediate scrutiny. 39 The Supreme Court, however, has stressed repeatedly that a plaintiff cannot rely solely upon a showing of
disproportionate impact to prove discriminatory intent. 4 0 Even so,
the Court has not rejected disproportionate impact as irrelevant to
finding a discriminatory purpose.4 1 In this connection, the Court
has found that certain circumstantial evidence may support the
inference of discriminatory purpose: a policy's historical background, 4 2 extreme disparate impact, 4 3 or the extreme discriminatory effect of administering a facially neutral policy upon a

35 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Note, supra note 33, at 793-94. For purposes
of comparison, the Supreme Court has held that classifications discriminating on the
basis of race trigger a strict level of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show
that the challenged policy is closely related to a compelling state interest. See Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Where race or
gender discrimination does not account for a challenged policy classification, the Court
has subjected the classification to the lowest level ofjudicial scrutiny-rational basis review. Under this test, a policy using the classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 55, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973); see also Note, supra note 33, at 793-94 (discussing the three levels ofjudicial scrutiny as enunciated and applied by the Supreme
Court).
36 Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-726 (1982) ("The
purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women." ) (footnote omitted).
37 See sources cited supra note 35.
38 See McKee, 877 F.2d at 421.
39 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976); Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th
Cir. 1988); Note, supra note 33, at 796.
40 See sources cited supra note 39.
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. The Court said:
[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact ... that the law bears more
heavily on one race [or gender] than another. It is also not infrequently
true that the discriminatory impact . . .may for all practical purposes
demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial [or gender-neutral]
grounds.
Id.
42 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-68 (1977).
43 Id. at 266; see also Note, supra note 33, at 796-97 ("In some rare cases, the Court
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particular class of individuals. 4 4
Courts typically invoke a gender-neutral standard to police
classifications distinguishing between "domestic violence" and
"nondomestic violence" situations when battered women claim that
such classifications discriminate against women victims. 4 5 Thus, in
order for a battered woman to establish an actionable section 1983
claim based on an equal protection violation, she must proffer the
46
requisite showing of discriminatory intent or purpose.
C.

Qualified Immunity Doctrine

Should a battered woman plaintiff proffer sufficient evidence of
an equal protection or due process violation, municipal police officers can still assert a qualified immunity defense. 4 7 Under the
qualified immunity doctrine, state officers performing discretionary
functions 48 are immune from lawsuits for damages provided their
conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 4 9 A
municipality itself, however, cannot invoke the qualified immunity
defense. 50 Thus, courts have allowed suits involving an unconstitutional policy or custom to proceed against a city even when qualified
immunity shields the individual police officers who executed the
challenged policy. 5 1
Because qualified immunity entitles an officer to "immunity
from suit," a defendant-officer must assert the defense on a motion
for summary judgment. 5 2 If a plaintiff proffers evidence creating a
held, the disparate impact of a policy or law might be so extreme as to permit an inference of discriminatory intent.") (footnote omitted).
44
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, cited in Note, supra note 33, at 797.
45 See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
46 This Note's analysis of battered women's equal protection claims is premised on
this assumption. See infra text accompanying notes 189-98.
47 See cases cited supra notes 2 & 4; McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409,
417 (5th Cir. 1989) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990).
48
Decisions regarding probable cause for arrest or type of intervention or response
to domestic violence calls constitute examples of discretionary functions performed by
police officers. See cases cited supra note 2. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816
(1982), the Court explained the nature of discretionary functions: "In contrast with the
thought processes accompanying 'ministerial' tasks, the judgments surrounding discretionary action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker's experiences, values, and emotions."
49 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
50 See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638, reh'g denied, 446 U.S.
993 (1980).
51 See Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988).
52 Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1028 (3d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
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genuine and material issue of fact, 53 this defense is lost and the case
proceeds to trial.5 4 Courts will grant qualified immunity "if reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could
have believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct
comported with established legal principles." 55 Based on this objective test, an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity depends
on the clarity of the law as it existed when a defendant-officer acted or
failed to act.5 6 "IT]he contours of the [constitutional] right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates the law."' 57 Section 1983 litigation involving battered women represents an evolving area of law in which the
Supreme Court has not ruled, lower courts have been inconsistent,
and many court opinions have either gone unpublished or cases
have been dismissed due to settlements between the parties.58
Thus, police officers can argue that the law was not "clearly established" as an authoritative guide to their conduct in responding to
domestic violence situations. 5 9
53 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (defining terms
"genuine" and "material" issues of fact).
54 See, e.g., Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1027 (enunciating summary judgment standard to
defeat police officers' qualified immunity defense); Watson, 857 F.2d at 694 (same); see
also infra text accompanying note 62.
55 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
56 The Court in Anderson v. Creighton explained that a right is not "clearly established" unless it has been recognized in similar or analogous circumstances. Anderson,
483 U.S. at 641.
57 Id.
58
See, e.g., Dudosh v. City of Allentown, No. 87-1522 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Not for Publication Opinion and has no precedential value"), rem'd, No. 85-4066 (E.D. Pa. Order of
Dismissal filed Sept. 30, 1989) (dismissing case due to settlement); Watson v. City of
Kansas City, Kan., No. 84-2335 (D. Kan. April 21, 1989) (dismissing case due to
settlement).
59 In granting individual police officers qualified immunity, the district court in
Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., No. 84-2335-S (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 1989) (WESTLAW,
DCTU file) reasoned:
[The battered woman plaintiff] allege[s] that the defendants violated
[her] constitutional right to equal protection by responding differently
and affording less protection to victims of domestic violence than to victims of nondomestic assaults. Thus, in determining whether qualified immunity applies, the court must decide whether it was clearly established
at the time of defendants' actions that the equal protection clause prohibited police officers from treating domestic and nondomestic assaults in a
different manner. The court finds that the use of the equal protection
clause to provide a theory of recovery in situations like the one presented
in this case is a very recent and novel development in equal protection
jurisprudence. There was no clearly established law regarding a city's or
police officers' liability for providing less protection in domestic violence
situations, until the [T]enth [C]ircuit's decision in this very case. ...
Although [the plaintiff's right] to equal protection of the laws was established, at the time of defendants' actions, it was not clearly established
that responding differently to domestic and nondomestic assaults could
serve as the basis of a particular equal protection claim.
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The Third Circuit applied the qualified immunity doctrine to a
case in which the mother and children of a battered womandecedent brought an equal protection claim under section 1983
against police officers who failed to protect the decedent. 60 The
court explained the rationale for the qualified immunity defense as
46a compromise between the conflicting concerns of permitting the
recovery of damages for vindication of constitutional rights caused
by the abuse of public office and permitting government officers to
perform discretionary functions without fear of harassing litigation." 6 1 The court, after reviewing general qualified immunity doctrine, enunciated the following standard for battered women's equal
protection claims:
[A] police officer loses a qualified immunity to a claim that a
facially neutral policy is executed in a discriminatory manner only
if a reasonable police officer would know that the policy has a discriminatory impact on women, that bias againstwomen was a motivating factor behind the adoption of the policy, and that there is no
62
important public interest served by the adoption of the policy.
This standard merely restates the elements of a gender-neutral
equal protection claim. 6 3 Regarding the intent element, a police officer can argue that a reasonable officer in his position would not
know that the originatorsof the policy were biased against women, or
that this bias was a reason for adopting the police policy. Thus, the
Third Circuit standard exemplifies the combined effect of the qualified immunity doctrine and a gender-neutral equal protection standard-a powerftl defense for police officers, and a formidable
hurdle for battered women seeking redress for the deprivation of
their constitutional rights.
II
THE CASES:

A.

A

CHRONOLOGY

Pre-DeShaney Domestic Violence Cases
An examination of a line of domestic violence cases in the dis-

Id. at 4-5 (WESTLAW paging).
60
Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, 864 F.2d 1026, 1026-27 (3d Cir. 1988).
Note that the plaintiffs also brought a due process claim based on alleged deprivations
of decedent's liberty and life, but this claim did not survive summary judgment in the
district court based on defendants' qualified immunity. Id. at 1026; see infra notes 95-99
and accompanying text.
61
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031-32 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987);
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 856 F.2d 594, 598 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated sub
nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 109 S.Ct. 1333 (1989)).
62 Id. at 1027.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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trict and circuit courts, beginning with Thurman v. City of Torrington,64
reveals the evolving standards and burdens for battered women in
establishing actionable section 1983 claims. 65 Despite some analytical inconsistencies, these cases collectively suggest that a section
1983 equal protection claim provides a more viable legal avenue for
66
redress than a due process claim.
In Thurman, a battered woman won her section 1983 lawsuit
against individual police officers based on an equal protection
claim. 67 The plaintiff alleged that "the defendants [police officers
and the city] use an administrative classification that manifests itself
in discriminatory treatment violative of the equal protection
clause."' 68 While police provided full protection to nondomestic
abuse victims, the plaintiff argued that the police observed a "pattern or practice" which "consistently afforded lesser protection" 6 9
to domestic abuse victims. Over an eight-month period of domestic
assaults and harassment culminating in a brutal stabbing of the
plaintiff, the police refused to arrest her estranged husband-batterer
70
or provide protection despite the plaintiff's repeated requests.
The Thurman court found that "[s]uch an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference raises an inference of 'custom' or 'policy' on the
71
part of the municipality."
The district court, on the city's motion to dismiss, approached
the plaintiff's equal protection claim in a novel fashion. As if to acknowledge the existence of a special relationship, 72 the court noted
that city officials and police officers who "have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships ... are under an
affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect [their] personal safety."' 73 Further, the court took implicit judicial notice 74
595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
See cases cited supra notes 2 & 4.
See cases cited supra notes 2 & 4.
Thurman, No. H-84-120 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 1985) (ruling on individual defendants' motion for judgment n.o.v.). "At trial, ajury awarded Tracey Thurman $2.3 million in damages against individual police officers, but not against the City of Torrington,
to compensate [her] for the brutal stabbing that resulted from the police's repeated
refusal to arrest her battering husband. The parties settled for $1.9 million." Note,
supra note 33, at 795 n.31 (citation omitted).
68
Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1526.
69 Id. at 1526-27.
70 Id. at 1524-26.
71
Id. at 1530 (citations omitted).
72 See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text. By alluding to a special relationship, the district court seemed to draw upon due process doctrine to begin its analysis of
the plaintiff's equal protection claim.
73
Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527.
74 See Note, supra note 33, at 794 n.30 ("The Torrington police department never
explicitly stated a gender-based classification, and the plaintiff never alleged the existence of such a classification.").
64
65
66
67
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that the challenged domestic violence/nondomestic violence policy
classification constituted explicit gender discrimination: "[The plaintiff's] allegations of gender-based discrimination will be taken as
true. In one study of interspousal abuse it is claimed that 'in 29 out
of every 30 such cases the husband stands accused of abusing his
wife.' "75 Because the city "failed to put forward any justification for
its disparate treatment of women," it did not meet its burden under
intermediate scrutiny. 7 6 Given the Thurman court's acceptance of
the domestic assault/nondomestic assault classification as genderbased discrimination, Thurman was a seminal case with potentially
monumental impact. 77 To date, however, other district and circuit
78
courts have applied stricter gender-neutral standards.
Three years after Thurman, the Tenth Circuit in Watson v. City of
Kansas City, Kansas7 9 subjected a challenged domestic violence/
nondomestic violence classification to equal protection standards
based on two separate grounds: (1) the class of domestic violence
victims without regard to gender; and (2) gender. The Watson court
articulated the first standard:
[T]o survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must go beyond her
pleadings and show that she has evidence of specific facts that
demonstrate that it is the policy or custom of the defendants to
provide less police protection to victims of domestic assault than
to other assault victims. She must alsoprovide evidence that discrimination was a motivatingfactor for the defendants and that she was injured by operation of the policy or custom.80
The plaintiff in Watson presented three forms of evidence which
81
the court found collectively sufficient to meet this first standard.
First, the plaintiff presented city statistics showing a higher percentage of arrests in nondomestic assault cases versus domestic assault

Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528 n.1 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1528; see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
77
See Note, supra note 33, at 794-95 n.30 (noting the Thurman court's equating a
pattern and practice of discrimination in administration of the law with an explicit sexbased classification).
78
See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text. Note that Thurman has not been
overturned, however.
79
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
80 Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
81 Id. at 695-96. The Watson court thus reversed the district court's order granting
summary judgment to the city and to individuals sued in their official capacity, and remanded. The case was subsequently dismissed with prejudice, each party bearing their
own costs. (Order of Dismissal, No. 84-2335 (D. Kan. April 21, 1989)). According to
one of the plaintiff's attorneys, the parties settled shortly after trial began. Telephone
interview with LynneJ. Bratcher, Esquire, Miller, Dougherty & Modin, Kansas City, Mo.
(Feb. 8, 1990).
75
76
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cases.8 2 Second, the plaintiff demonstrated that the trainingmethods
83
of police officers for domestic violence cases discouraged arrests.
Third, the plaintiff presented a personal history of batterings and repeated police failure to act upon her requests for protection.8 4 Regarding the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, however, the
court found that the "evidence presented does not show that a policy which discriminates against victims of domestic violence adversely affects women." 8 5 Thus, the court rejected her claim of
gender discrimination.8 6 Even if she had presented evidence of the
challenged police policy's adverse impact on female domestic violence victims, the court explained, the plaintiff would still have a
"heavy" burden in showing a discriminatory intent or purpose for
87
the policy classification under a gender-neutral standard.
Following Watson's lead three months later in Hynson v. City of
Chester, Legal Department,8 8 the Third Circuit announced a newly articulated gender-neutral standard8 9 tailored to battered women's
equal protection claims under section 1983:
In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must proffer
sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that
it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to
victims of domestic violence than to other victims of violence, that
discrimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the
plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom. 90

The Hynson court declared that this standard defined the "constitutional right which the plaintiffs must show was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation in order to negate the police officers' qualified immunity.," 9 1 Under the facts of Hynson, responding
82

Watson, 857 F.2d at 696 (noting that "statistical evidence alone may not be

enough to prove the existence of a policy or custom").
83 Id.
84 Id. (noting that: "[s]uch a pattern, when examined in the context of other evidence the plaintiff has presented, constitutes evidence of a custom or policy.... We
doubt whether evidence of deliberate indifference in the plaintiff's case alone would be
sufficient evidence of different treatment.") (emphasis in original). But see Thurman, 595 F.
Supp. at 1530 (finding that history of continued assaults and threats on plaintiff despite
repeated requests for police intervention was sufficient, by itself, to raise inference of an
unconstitutionally gender-based municipal policy or custom).
85
Watson, 857 F.2d at 696.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 696-97.
88 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988).
89 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text; see also Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1027
("Because the police policy or custom at issue here-that allegedly police officers treat
domestic abuse victims differently than other victims of violent crimes-is not discriminatory toward women on its face, we must therefore apply the facially neutral policy
analysis .... ") (citation omitted).
90 Id. at 1031 (emphasis added).
91
Id.; see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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police officers refused to arrest the decedent's boyfriend-murderer
the day before her murder because the decedent's most recent restraining order had expired. 92 The plaintiffs alleged that the police
"pursued a policy of ignoring domestic abuse complaints." 9 3 The
Third Circuit vacated the district court's order denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
94
and remanded the case for application of its enunciated standard.
The plaintiffs in Hynson originally alleged violations of the battered woman-decedent's due process rights to life and liberty, as
well as the equal protection claim. 95 The due .process claim did not
survive the defendants' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. 9 6 Nevertheless, the district court's analysis of the
due process claim exemplifies the uncertain state of the special relationship doctrine and the consequent advantages of an equal protection claim.
Specifically, the district court found that the decedent's "interaction with the individual officers and her membership in a protected class (by virtue of the protection from abuse order . . .)
established the special relationship between herself and the state
necessary to maintain a section 1983 suit."9 7 Even so, the district
court reasoned, the applicable law at the time of the officers' nonintervention was not so clearly established as to override the officers' qualified immunity. 98 The court noted: "In 1988 the courts
are still attempting to clarify and define the parameters of what constitutes a special relationship in a due process claim for affirmative
protection of life or liberty." 9 9
Four months later, the Ninth Circuit fueled the uncertainties
and inconsistencies in applying the special relationship doctrine to
the domestic violence context. In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 10 0 the Ninth Circuit found that a special relationship existed by
considering a battered woman's "restraining order together with
the defendants' [police officers'] repeated notice of [her] plight."' 0 1
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1027-28.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1033.
Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep't, No. 86-2913 (E.D. Pa. April 19, 1988)
(WESTLAW, DCTU file).
96
Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1033.
97 Hynson, No. 86-2913 at 14.
98
Id. at 16.
92

93
94
95

99

Id. at 16-17.

855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988). This opinion was recently amended and superseded in light of DeShaney's narrowing of the special relationship doctrine. Balistreri,901
F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). For a full discussion of DeShaney's impact, see infra Part III.
101 Id. at 1426. The dissent's disagreement with the majority's finding of a special
relationship highlights its significance: "[n]o case has held that the existence of a restraining order establishes the requisite 'special relationship.'" Id. at 1428 (LaughlinJ.,
100
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This combination of factors, the court concluded, was "sufficient to
state a [due process] claim that the defendants owed [the battered
woman-plaintiff] a duty to take reasonable measures to protect [her]
from her estranged husband."1 0 2 The court also found that the
plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts "to suggest animus against [her]
because she is a woman," 10 3 thus reversing the district court's dismissal of her equal protection claim.
With Balistreri as a notable exception, the collective results of
these cases indicate that battered women's due process claims
against police officers for failing to protect them have not been as
promising as equal protection claims. Courts have been more receptive to the merits of battered women's equal protection claims
when these plaintiffs show that police follow a policy of providing
less protection to domestic violence victims. 10 4 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services10 5 supports these observations in the domestic violence context. In view of the ill-defined
scope of the special relationship doctrine and the consequent inconsistencies regarding the extent of government's affirmative constitutional obligations, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
10 6
settle these uncertainties in DeShaney.
B.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
1. Facts

Joshua DeShaney, a child abuse victim, and his mother sued
Winnebago County authorities and individual social workers at the
Department of Social Services (DSS) under section 1983 for "failing
to intervene to protect [Joshua] against a risk of violence... [by his
father, Randy DeShaney] of which [these respondents] knew or
dissenting in part) (citing Dudosh v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381, 390 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314, 318-19 (D.S.C. 1987)); see
supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
102 Balistreri, 855 F.2d 1421, 1426.
103
Id. at 1427. The court noted a responding police officer's alleged remark to Balistreri (he "did not blame [plaintiff's] husband for hitting her, because of the way she
was 'carrying on.' "). The court found that "[s]uch remarks strongly suggest an intention to treat domestic abuse cases less seriously than other [nondomestic] assaults, as
well as an animus against abused women." Id.
104
See cases cited supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 64-96.
105 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
106 The DeShaney court stated:
Because of the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts in determining when, if ever, the failure of a state or local governmental entity
or its agents to provide an individual with adequate protective services
constitutes a violation of the individual's due process rights, .. . and the
importance of the issue to the administration of state and local governments, we granted certiorari.
Id. at 1002 (citations omitted).
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should have known."' 0 7 Specifically, Joshua and his mother alleged
that the respondents "deprived Joshua of his liberty interest in
'free[dom] from... unjustified intrusions on personal security' "108
under the due process clause.
Over a two-year period, Joshua sustained various injuries requiring emergency room treatment. 10 9 In January 1982, Randy
DeShaney's second wife first notified DSS of Joshua's predicament
by reporting the father's abuse." 10 Randy DeShaney denied the accusation in a follow-up interview with DSS; DSS declined to consider the matter further."' In January 1983, after Joshua was
admitted to a hospital for bruises and abrasions, an examining physician suspected child abuse and notified DSS. 1 12 DSS obtained a
113
court order placing Joshua in the hospital's temporary custody.
After a "Child Protection Team" determined that there was insufficient evidence of child abuse, the juvenile court releasedJoshua into
Randy DeShaney's custody. 1 4 Randy DeShaney entered an agreement with DSS to abide by certain custodial conditions. 1 5 Over the
next six months, a particular social worker visited the DeShaney
home once a month, and reported that Randy DeShaney was not
abiding by the agreement terms. 1 6 On more than one visit, the social worker noted "suspicious injuries" on Joshua's head. In March
1984, Joshua received a severe beating to the head requiring emergency brain surgery after he became comatose. 1 7 During the oper18
ation, the surgeon found evidence of prolonged traumatic injury. 8
Joshua is now profoundly retarded and institutionalized." 19
The district court granted summary judgment for DSS, concluding that "the failure of a state agency to render protective services to persons within its jurisdiction does not violate the due
process clause."120 The district court found that no special relationship existed between Joshua and the state, emphasizing the fact that
Joshua was not in the state's custody "at the time of or immediately
107
108

109
110
'''

112
113
114
115
116
117

Id.
Id. at 1002-03 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
Id. at 1001-02.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Id.

118

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1002.
Id.

119

Id.

120 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 73, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs. (1989) (No. 87-154).
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prior to the March 8, 1984 beating."' 2 1
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a "state's failure
to protect people from private violence, or other mishaps not attributable to the conduct of its employees, is not a deprivation of constitutionally protected property or liberty."' 12 2 Additionally, the
Seventh Circuit found that the requisite causal connection between
the state's inaction and Joshua's injury was lacking.' 23
2.

The Supreme Court Decision

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding. 24 Noting the language and history of the due process clause, as well as relevant Supreme Court precedent, the Court
concluded that "a State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause."' 12 5 The Court declined to consider the petitioners'
argument, raised for the first time in their brief to the Court, that
the state's child protection statute gave Joshua a property entitle126
ment to protection from abuse.
Despite the respondents' knowledge of the special danger to
Joshua, as well as their asserted intention to protect him, the Court
rejected the argument that a special relationship existed. 12 7 The
Id. at 71-72.
122 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th
Cir. 1987).
123
Id. at 302-03.
124 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1002
(1989).
125
Id. at 1004.
126 Id. at 1003 n.2. By declining to consider the petitioners' property entitlement
claim, the Court did not reject this claim either. By analogy, battered women could use
the petitioners' argument if their states have enacted domestic violence statutes that
limit police discretion by mandating procedures and intervention responses. See infra
notes 177-82 and accompanying text. Specifically, the petitioners argued:
Under [the Wisconsin child protection statutes] the discretion of the
authorities of the [Department of Social Services] is severely restricted.
The response to a report, the short time for starting the investigation, the
requirements for reporting to the state and to the person who originally
reported the concern, and the rest of the mandates leave little if any room
for doing anything other than carrying out the terms of the statute....
121

Petitioners urge that the scheme of the [statutes] is sufficiently extensive and detailed, and impacts heavily enough upon an endangered child
...that it more than meets the test of Board of Regents v. Roth, .. . and that
it creates an entitlement which the authorities may not take away without
due process of law. In view of the facts of this case it is clear that the
defendants violated not only their mandatory statutory duties but also
Joshua's due process rights arising under the statutory scheme.
Brief for Petitioners at 27-29, DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) (No. 87-154).
127 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004; see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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Court thereby narrowed the special relationship doctrine to state
custodial situations, such as "incarceration or institutionalization,"
or a "sufficiently analogous situation." 128 The Court apparently rejected the consideration of several factors prkviously cited by vari129
ous circuit courts.
The Court, however, signalled the viability of two other legal
avenues which have important implications for future litigation.
First, the Court qualified its holding by reaffirming the validity of an
equal protection claim: "[t]he State may not, of course, selectively
deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without
violating the Equal Protection Clause.... But no such argument has
been made here."'13 0 Second, the Court further suggested that state
tort law would be a preferred "system of liability" in situations
where state agents fail to act when under a state-imposed duty to do
so.13 1 In reiterating that tort liability is separate from due process
violations, the Court stated: "not . . . every tort committed by a

state actor" 13 2 converts to a "constitutional violation" with the assertion of a due process claim.' 3 3 Thus, the Court refused to expand the scope of section 1983 to encompass state tort law, as if to
13 4
redirect such claims to the states.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05 & n.9.
Id. at 1004 & n.4 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 142526 (9th Cir. 1988); Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d
Cir. 1985);Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 & n.ll (4th Cir. 1984) (dicta), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985)). The Court explained:
The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of
the individual's predicament or from its expressions, of intent to help
him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf.... In the substantive due process analysis, it is the
State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his
own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar
restraint of personal liberty-which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to
protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006 (citation omitted); see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying
text.
130 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3 (citation omitted); see infra notes 183-99 and
accompanying text.
131 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007 ("A State may, through its courts and legislatures,
impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes."); see
infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
132 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.
133 Id.
134
The DeShaney Court stated:
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which
would place upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to
act in situations such as the present one.... But they should not have it
thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Noting the DeShaney Court's apparent federalism concerns, one commentator observed: "[T]he Court might have denied relief in order to avoid treading on what, ac128

129
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Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun.' 3 5 Justice Brennan argued that the constitutional analysis of the petitioners' claim should have been framed from a state
action perspective, rather than an initial fixation on inaction.13 6 Specifically, Justice Brennan asserted the significance of the State's
prior actions in establishing and operating a child-welfare system
created to protect children from abuse.13 7 Not only did the State's
system displace private sources of protection, Brennan argued, but
the State's subsequent inaction may have arbitrarily, and unconstitu38
tionally, denied its protection to Joshua.
III
ANALYsIs

A. The Aftermath of DeShaney in the Domestic Violence
Context

Like Joshua DeShaney, battered women plaintiffs have relied
upon section 1983 to seek federal redress for their constitutional
deprivations resulting from the state's failure to intervene in domestic abuse situations. Because of this close analogy, battered women
plaintiffs will feel DeShaney's impact, particularly those asserting substantive due process claims. The Court's significant narrowing of
the special relationship doctrine to state custodial relationships effectively forecloses this due process avenue for battered women. In
DeShaney, however, the Court kept the equal protection avenue
open,139 thus signalling its continued availability as a legal avenue to
recovery for battered women.
In a recent post-DeShaney domestic violence case, McKee v. City
of Rockwall, Texas,140 the Fifth Circuit provided the first indication of
DeShaney's impact by confirming DeShaney's apparent foreclosure of
substantive due process claims.' 4 ' The plaintiff, a domestic assault
victim, sued responding police officers and the city under section
1983 for injuries resulting from the police officers' refusal to arrest
her boyfriend-assaulter. McKee asserted an equal protection violacording to some observers, should remain state responsibilities. Indeed, traces of these
arguments appear between the lines of the majority's opinion." The Supreme CourtLeading Cases, 103 HAsv. L. Rav. 167, 175-76 & nn.73 & 74 (1989). But see supra text
accompanying note 13 (discussing original purpose of section 1983).
135
136
137
138

DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1007.

139

Id. at 1004 n.3 (majority opinion).

140

877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 727 (1990).

141

L at 413 (suggesting that if McKee had claimed a due process violation, her

Id. at 1008 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1010-11.

section 1983 suit would have been "directly barred by the holding in DeShaney").
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tion, alleging that this "non-arrest was the result of a [city] policy
that discriminated on the basis of gender" 14 2 because it discouraged
officers from making arrests in domestic violence situations.
Despite the plaintiff's proffered evidence of a police chief's
statement that his officers "did not like to make arrests in domestic
assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges
or would drop them prior to trial," 1 43 and city statistics comparing
arrest rates in domestic violence and other assault cases, 14 4 the Fifth
Circuit found that the plaintiff "failed to provide any evidence tending to show that the officers' inaction was a consequence of discrimination against a protected minority."' 4 5 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of the police officers' motion for
14 6
summary judgment and dismissed all claims against them.
The McKee court acknowledged the significance of DeShaney in
its analysis of the plaintiff's equal protection claim:
Because McKee's complaint sounds in Equal Protection,
rather than Due Process, it is not directly barred by the holding in
DeShaney. DeShaney is nonetheless relevant to our analysis of this
case. The Court's opinion in DeShaney endorses the general principle that choices about the "extent of governmental obligation"
to protect private parties from one another have been left "to the
democratic political processes." There is no constitutional violation when the "most that can be said of... state functionaries ...
is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role." Footnote three [of the
DeShaney opinion] does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule
of DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim via an allegation that state officers exercised discretion to act in one incident
142
143

Id. at 409.

Id. at 411. The majority found that the police chief's statement indicated a mere
dislike, not a city policy. Id. at 415. Dissenting in part, Judge Goldberg argued: "When
the Chief states-that women, not men, are the victims in 'domestic' assault cases-the
plaintiff hurdles a barrier which is extremely difficult to ascend. This supplies the understanding that domestic assault affects women." Id. at 424 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in
part) (emphasis in original). Goldberg also acknowledged that women predominate in
the class of domestic violence victims, but noted: "Our equal protection jurisprudence
requires evidence of a classification; judicial notice will not do." Id.
144 The McKee court rejected the statistical evidence for three reasons. First, in two
of the four years involving complete data, the domestic violence arrest rate was higher
than the cleared [nondomestic] assault rate. Second, the statistics did not adjust for
other factors impacting arrests (e.g., whether the victim refused to press charges when
the police arrived). Third, the statistics failed to give a breakdown by gender (e.g., the
number of female victims in cleared assault cases or the number of male victims in domestic violence cases). Id. at 415 (majority opinion).
145
Id. at 416. Judge Goldberg, dissenting in part, noted that the majority's conclusion that McKee failed to establish any claim, "virtually preordains judgment for the City
...on remand." Id. at 417 n.2 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part).
146 Id. at 416 (majority opinion). The Fifth Circuit mentioned the fact that the district court's disposition of the case occurred prior to DeShaney. Id. at 413.
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but not in another. 14 7
The McKee court interpreted the officers' discretion not to arrest the
plaintiff's boyfriend-assaulter as consistent with the DeShaney proposition that law enforcement officers' "authority to act does not imply
... [their] constitutional duty to act."' 48 Thus, the majority's interpretation of DeShaney was instrumental in its unfavorable disposition
of the plaintiff's equal protection claim.
Judge Goldberg, dissenting in part, asserted that DeShaney, a
substantive due process case, was irrelevant to McKee's equal protection claim. 149 Goldberg disagreed with the majority's interpreta-

tion of DeShaney "as a general statement that governmental officers,
in their actions, enjoy a zone of discretion regardless of the Fourteenth Amendment right involved."' 150 Further, Goldberg considered the police chief's statement a central piece of evidence which
created an issue of fact regarding the discriminatory treatment of
women. 15 1 Consequently, Goldberg argued that the plaintiff's
equal protection claim should have survived the defendants' motion
1 52
for summary judgment.
Goldberg concurred, however, in the majority's dismissal of
the plaintiff's equal protection claim against the police officers, basing the dismissal instead on qualified immunity.' 53 Goldberg
concluded:
[A] reasonable officer would [not] know that a defacto city custom
or policy, and his own actions manifesting the same notions,
footed in stereotypes buried deeply in our culture, would violate
the Constitution. No published decision in this Circuit sets forth
such a theory of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supreme
15 4
Court has not spoken specifically on this subject.

Judge Goldberg's concern with the majority's misapplication of
DeShaney 155 signalled the importance of reassessing available legal
avenues for battered women.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted).
Id. at 414.
149 McKee, 877 F.2d at 417 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part). Goldberg suggested
that the distinction between DeShaney and equal protection claims in the domestic violence context "is sure to stand important in the future." Id.
147
148

150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 417.

153
154

Id.
Id. at 425-26.

155 See id. at 418 ("The 'democratic political processes' upon which the [McKee] majority rests its hope that all people receive equal protection of the law is not adequate for
the task of protecting people when distinctions are made upon ... quasi-suspect classifications [like gender].") (citations omitted).
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A Post-DeShaney Assessment of Legal Avenues
1. Due Process Claims Alleging Liberty Deprivations

By analogy, the DeShaney holding forecloses due process claims
for battered women plaintiffs suing the police under section 1983
for alleged liberty deprivations.1 56 This foreclosure rests on the
DeShaney Court's explicit restriction of the special relationship doctrine to state custodial relationships.15 7 Indeed, a battered woman
plaintiff would be hard pressed to argue that her situation is "sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization"' 158 to trigger a state's affirmative duty of protection.
In an analogous post-DeShaney case, however, a sexual assault
victim found an avenue around the special relationship barrier, even
though her section 1983 claim alleged a liberty deprivation. In
Stoneking v. BradfordArea School District,'59 a high school band director sexually harassed and victimized the plaintiff over a period of
60
several years, despite repeated complaints to high school officials.'
The Third Circuit initially considered the case prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney.' 6 ' It found a special relationship
under applicable state and common law which triggered the school
officials' affirmative duty to protect students' liberty interests under
the due process clause.' 62 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of summary judgment to the defendants based on
156
Under DeShaney's reasoning, the actor inflicting injury on a battered woman is
her battering husband or boyfriend, not a state actor. Since the state has no affirmative
duty to protect individuals against private violence, the police's failure to intervene in
battering situations does not constitute a due process violation.
157 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. Recent case law, decided during
publication of this Note, confirms this assertion. In a second amended opinion filed May
11, 1990, the Ninth Circuit retracted its original finding of a special relationship in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). Affirming the district court's
dismissal of the battered woman's due process claim, the Ninth Circuit found DeShaney
controlling: "We conclude that the state's knowledge of DeShaney's plight and its expressions of intent to help him were no greater than its knowledge of Balistreri's plight
and its expressions of intent to help her." Id. at 700; see iupra text accompanying notes
100-02.
158
DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 n.9. The Court explained:
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty-which is the "deprivation of liberty" triggering the protections
of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.
Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted).
159 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 840 (1990).
160
Id. at 722.
161
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 856 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated sub
nom. Smith v. Stoneking, 109 S.Ct. 1333 (1989).
162
Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 723.
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their lack of qualified immunity.1 6 3
The Supreme Court remanded to the Third Circuit to reconsider Stoneking's due process claim in light of DeShaney. The Third
Circuit found that Stoneking's section 1983 due process claim remained viable even if the defendants had no "predicate duty"' 6 4 to
protect the plaintiff, because the plaintiff alleged a distinct theory of
liability independent of the special relationship doctrine.' 65 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, "with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice, or custom which directly caused her constitutional
harm."' 166 Under this theory, the plaintiff argued:
[D]efendants are liable because of their own actions in adopting
and maintaining a practice, custom or policy of reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse of students
by teachers, in concealing complaints of abuse, and in discouraging students' complaints about such conduct.... [T]hese practices, customs or policies created a climate which ... facilitated
sexual abuse of students by teachers in general, and that there was
a causal relationship between these practices, customs or policies
and the repeated sexual assaults against her by [the band
67
director]. 1
The Stoneking court endorsed the plaintiff's theory, stating: "This is
an independent basis for liability.., which is unrelated to the issue
decided in DeShaney. Liability of municipal policymakers for policies
or customs chosen or recklessly maintained is not dependent upon
the existence of a 'special relationship' between the municipal offi68
cials and the individuals harmed."'
The United States Supreme Court recently upheld a similar theory of municipal liability in City of Canton v. Harris,16 9 decided six
days after DeShaney. In Canton, the Court found the City of Canton
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 725.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 724-25.

Id. at 725. Note that the Supreme Court could have granted certiorari if the
Stoneking court had misinterpreted its decision in DeShaney. Indeed, the Third Circuit in
Stoneking stated:
Nothing in DeShaney suggests that state officials may escape liability
arising from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions
taken by their subordinates. As the Supreme Court recently reconfirmed
in City of Canton v. Harris ....a municipality may be liable under section
1983 where its policymakers made "a deliberate choice to follow a course
of action... from among various alternatives," ... and the policy chosen
"reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of [the city's]
inhabitants."
Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
169
109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989). Indeed, the Third Circuit in Stoneking relied on the Can-
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liable for constitutional violations resulting from its failure to adequately train its police officers to recognize when detainees required
medical assistance. 170 To invoke the "failure to train" 171 theory, the
Court required that this failure amount to the city's "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
72
contact."1
That the plaintiff-detainee was in police custody at the time of
her alleged liberty deprivation presumably would have been enough
to establish a special relationship after DeShaney. The Canton Court,
however, neither invoked the special relationship doctrine in deciding this case nor mentioned DeShaney in its opinion. Rather, the
Canton Court treated the plaintiff's "failure to train" theory of mu17 3
nicipal liability as a distinct substantive due process claim.
Canton and Stoneking suggest a potentially promising legal aveton decision as validation for the plaintiff's theory of liability. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725.
The Stoneking court discussed the reasoning in Canton:
[I]f the need for more or different training [of its employees] is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, "the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need." It continued, "[i]n that event,
the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a
policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held
liable if it actually causes injury."
Id. (citations omitted).
170
Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1204.
171 Id. at 1203.
172
Id. Regarding the "deliberate indifference" standard, the Court explained:
To adopt [a] lesser standard of fault ... would open municipalities to
unprecedented liability under § 1983 .... It would also engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee
training programs. This is an exercise we believe the federal courts are
ill-suited to undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious questions of federalism.
Id. at 1206 (citations omitted).
173
The Canton Court relied upon Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), for the proposition that a municipality can be held liable under
section 1983 by executing a policy which causes constitutional deprivations to individuas. Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1203. The Court in DeShaney did not address this theory of
liability, stating in a footnote:
Because we conclude that the Due Process Clause did not require the
State to protectJoshua from his father, we need not address respondents'
alternative argument that the individual state actors lacked the requisite
"state of mind" to make out a due process violation. Similarly, we have
no occasion to consider whether ...the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to support a § 1983 claim against the county and its Department of Social Services under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
and its progeny.
DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1007 n.10 (citations omitted). One could interpret this footnote
to mean that the Court's reason for not considering the Monell theory was its finding, in
the first instance, that no special relationship existed to trigger the State's affirmative
duty to protect. The Canton Court, just six days after DeShaney, did not make an explicit
finding of a special relationship a precondition for invoking the "failure to train" theory.
Canton, 109 S.Ct. at 1203. ("[O]ur first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability
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nue for battered women plaintiffs. These plaintiffs could argue
analogously that a municipality's liability is triggered when it maintains, or persists in following, a policy of lesser protection for domestic violence victims with deliberate indifference to the policy's
disproportionate impact on women. Because this theory circumvents the special relationship doctrine, a battered woman could still
claim a liberty deprivation under the due process clause. A battered
woman might also assert a "failure to train" 174 claim if she could
proffer evidence that a city's inadequate police training regarding
domestic violence calls amounted to deliberate indifference to the
need for heightened protection for these victims.
2.

Due Process Claims Alleging Property Entitlements to Police
Protection

DeShaney did not address the validity of a section 1983 claim
based on an alleged property entitlement to the state's protection. 175 Even though the DeShaney majority explicitly declined to
consider this theory, 176 Justice Brennan's dissenting argumentthat the state assumed a duty to protect children from abuse via statute and then ignored that duty in Joshua's case-could be construed
as an implicit acknowledgment of an abused child's property entitlement to the state's protection.' 77 A withdrawal of its protection
under § 1983 is the question of whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal
policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.").
174 Canton, 109 S. Ct. at 1203.
175 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2; see supra note 126 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court has found that state statutes can create a property entitlement to government benefits or services. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Comment, supra note 5, at 1069. These statutes
must sufficiently limit the discretion of government officials in determining whether a
particular individual qualifies as a beneficiary. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.
369, 382 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Once an individual meets the qualifying
criteria, the individual may assert a protected property interest in the state's services or
benefits which a legitimate claim of entitlement supports. See Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972); see also Comment, supra note 5, at 1065, 1068-69, 1073 (discussing
property entitlement argument for foster children). This commentator elaborated:
[PIroperty interests 'are created ... by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits.' Hence, due process safeguards do
not exist to protect benefits for their own sake, but rather to protect the
expectation a state creates by making promises on which individuals rely;
in short, the Court has held that a state acts unfairly when it arbitrarily
goes back on its promises.
Id. at 1065 (citation omitted). If government officials decide to withdraw benefits, these
officials would be required to comply with procedural due process requirements (e.g.,
providing the individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard). See id.
176
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2.
177
Id. at 1010 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan would have allowed the petitioners "the opportunity to show that respondents' failure to help Joshua] arose... from
the kind of arbitrariness that we have in the past condemned." Id. at 1011.

1418

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1393

would therefore oblige the state to meet certain procedural due pro78
cess requirements to justify that withdrawal.'
By analogy, a property entitlement theory might work for battered women. 17 9 Although police protection provided on a general
basis is not a protected property interest under the due process
clause, 180 state domestic violence statutes that limit police discretion
in responding to domestic violence calls arguably create property
entitlements to police protection. 18 1 The validity of this theory,
178 One commentator proposed and developed this argument based on Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding an entitlement to welfare under state statute):
As in Goldberg, the question is not whether government benefits are constitutionally required in the first instance, but under what circumstances
those benefits, once conferred, may be constitutionally withdrawn. On
this view, the "greater" power to deny all benefits does not include the
"lesser" power to withdraw benefits arbitrarily.... mhe state's failure to
follow through on its promises is fundamentally different from the failure
to act when no promise was made.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1066-67.
179 The question of "what process is due" for procedural due process protection,
however, may limit the utility of a property entitlement claim for battered women.
Predeprivation procedures (e.g., hearings or opportunities to be heard) arguably are infeasible when police receive a request for immediate assistance from a battered woman,
but intentionally or recklessly fail to intervene. As if to respond to this concern, one
commentator stated:
mhe [procedural] protections required may look quite different from
the evidentiary hearing ordered in Goldberg [v. Kelly]. Often it will be
quite easy to determine whether an individual falls within the class of persons who are entitled to rely on the state's self-imposed obligation to act;
for example, it is easy to identify foster children who have been explicitly
granted certain kinds of protection by the state. Since such a decision
does not involve factual determinations that are best made in a full hearing, a state need only provide enough procedure to make the decision
reasonably accurate. At the same time, if the correct decision is plain,
evidence that the state incorrectly decided it will probably suffice to show
that the procedures were inadequate. Moreover, in the state inaction

cases .... the complaint is not simply that the state provides inadequate

procedures, but that it provides no procedural protection at all.
... Where procedures would have resulted in the state conferring
the benefit it promised, the state is liable to the full extent of the injury
that would have been prevented. For example, a foster child who would
have been saved from abuse had the state adequately considered its decision to withdraw promised protection would be able to recover for all
injuries resulting from the abuse.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1071-72 (emphasis in original).
180
See Comment, supra note 5, at 1069; supra note 16 and accompanying text.
181 Florida, for example, has a provision in its Domestic Relations statute enumerating law enforcement officers' investigation responsibilities in responding to incidents of
domestic violence. These responsibilities include both providing the victim with notice
of legal rights and remedies and mandatory reporting of the domestic violence incident.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 (West 1986). Similarly, New Jersey has a Prevention of Domestic Violence Act that declares: "It is ...the intent of the Legislature to assure the
victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide."
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). Subsequent sections describe
mandatory responsibilities and procedures for law enforcement officers to follow in responding to domestic violence calls. Id. §§ 2C:25-4 to :25-8. One provision requires:
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albeit untested,1 8 2 may well depend on a state's specific statutory
terms (e.g., whether the terms sufficiently limit police discretion),
and federal courts' sensitivity to intrusions on the states' autonomy.
3.

Equal Protection Claims

In domestic violence cases prior to DeShaney, battered women
tended to be more successful in asserting equal protection claims
than due process claims.18 3 As DeShaney reaffirmed the viability of
equal protection claims under section 1983, this trend should continue.1 8 4 And yet, recent summary judgment standards articulated
"[A]II training for law enforcement officers on the handling of domestic violence complaints shall stress the enforcement of criminal laws in domestic situations, the protection of the victim, and the use of available community resources." Id. § 2C:25-4; see also
IL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2313-1 to 2313-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989) (clarifying
responsibilities of law enforcement officers in clear and sufficient terms, thereby restricting officers' discretion in "provid[ing] immediate, effective assistance and protection for
victims of domestic violence"); id. ch. 40, para. 2311-2(4). For comprehensive surveys
of domestic violence legislation, see Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposalsfor Reform, 14 SETON HA.L 74 (1983); Lisa G. Lerman &
Franci Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE, No. 5, Sept./Oct.
1983 (available from Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.). As if to
draw a distinction between domestic violence statutes and statutes creating police forces
for protection of the general public, one commentator noted:
Laws creating police forces ... do not limit discretion in this way. They
do not specify a particular class of citizens that is to benefit specially from
police protection, nor do they limit the state's discretion in deciding
when to provide such protection; rather, such laws are designed to provide protection on a general basis and not to any particular individual or
class. This kind of statute does not create a property interest for a particular individual that could be invoked in a section 1983 case.
Comment, supra note 5, at 1069-70.
182 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1003 n.2 (1989); see supra note 126. The courts have not
yet ruled definitively on the validity of the property entitlement theory for battered
women plaintiffs. But cf Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314, 318-19
(D.S.C. 1987) (finding, under special relationship doctrine, that State's Protection from
Domestic Abuse Act did not create an "express duty of protection, or intervention, in
domestic cases, but rather provides only that law enforcement officers take certain protective measures when responding to a domestic abuse incident."); Taylor v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding the state foster care statutory scheme supported a
child's entitlement claim of procedural due process for deprivation of a liberty interest
in personal safety). The court said: "Since the child's claim under [Board of Regents v.]
Roth is a procedural due process claim, the state... may alter its statutes and ordinances
in such a way as to change or eliminate the expectation on which this child had the right
to rely." Id. at 800.
183
See cases cited supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 69-94.
184 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004 n.3; Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696
(9th Cir.) (second amended opinion filed May 11, 1990). In reversing the district court's
dismissal with prejudice of a battered woman's equal protection claim, the court stated:
Plaintiff's . . . equal protection claim was based upon sex and marital
status. The response [to the motion to dismiss] stated that plaintiff "has
alleged facts indicating that as a woman, she was discriminated against
when seeking police protection from a known danger, her former husband." The response cited as support for its legal theory Thurman v. City
of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), one of several district
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by the Tenth Circuit in Watson v. City ofKansas City, Kansas 185 and the
Third Circuit in Hynson v. City of Chester Legal Department 18 6 impose
heavy evidentiary burdens on battered women to override police officers' qualified immunity defense. Since municipalities cannot invoke that defense, 187 battered women plaintiffs have been able to
proceed to trial against city-defendants via a "policy or custom"
claim. 188 Thus, battered women should actively seek recovery
against municipalities rather than municipal employees in their individual capacities.
Because courts will apply a heightened level of scrutiny 8 9 to
classifications based on gender, battered women's chances for recovery are enhanced if they can establish that a police policy classification discriminates against women. Gender-neutral standards' 90
requiring evidence of discriminatory intent will pose unjustly difficult hurdles for plaintiffs if courts remain unwilling to accept evidence of extreme disparate impact on women as sufficient evidence
of discriminatory intent. Despite studies showing that women
predominate the class of domestic violence victims, 19 1 and that police are well aware of this,192 courts may find insufficient evidence of
court decisions which have held that police failure to respond to complaints lodged by women in domestic violence cases may violate equal
protection.
Id. at 701.
185
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (class-based discrimination based on status as domestic violence victim).
186 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988) (gender discrimination).
187
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. As Judge Goldberg noted in McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1989):
Under our classification-based equal protection jurisprudence, whether a
female plaintiff falls into a class of domestic abuse victims, orfemale domestic abuse victims, may determine the appropriate level of scrutiny...
for her [equal protection] claim.... The labels domestic violence or domestic assault tend to hide the gender of the victims in such cases.... A
general observation of our society confirms... that women are the victims in domestic violence situations.
(Goldberg, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
190 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
notes 89-91.
191 See Note, supra note 33, at 799 n.49 (citing DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVEs 14 (1st
ed. 1976) (showing statistics from several cities)); Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 582
n.2, 393 N.E.2d 976, 977 n.2, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 n.2 (1979) (citing 1978 study by
Henry Street Settlement Urban Life Center, showing 29 out of 30 domestic violence
complaints in New York City made by women).
192
One commentator, noting statistical tracking studies, asserted:
Police are aware that their non-arrest policy disproportionately
harms women, because the domestic violence victims that they see on
their jobs are mostly women. Police manuals and testimonial admissions
further demonstrate police officers' awareness that women are the major
victims of domestic violence. Even if police do not know that arrest is the
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discriminatory intent if other police justifications adequately explain
challenged policy classifications. For example, police may argue
that domestic violence victims typically drop charges or request that
their batterers not be arrested.1 93 Consequently, to- improve efficient police resource allocation, police may adopt a policy differenti94
ating between domestic and nondomestic assaults.
Courts, police departments, and municipalities should not disregard the statistical fact' 9 5 that affording less protection to domestic violence victims means that women will be adversely affected.
Many municipalities have acknowledged this and are revising their
policies accordingly.' 9 6 Since it is unlikely that courts will judicially
notice explicit gender-based classifications given the neutral labels
of domestic violence/nondomestic violence, battered women should
be prepared to present evidence of disparate impact and treatment.
Courts and juries could infer discriminatory intent against women

from police statistics showing that women comprised the majority of
domestic assaults, and that domestic assault arrest rates were consistently lower than other assault arrest rates. 97 Evidence of police
training methods that discourage arrests in domestic violence cases
or rationalize different treatment for domestic violence victims may
support statistical discrepancies between domestic and nondomestic
best means of preventing violence, they do know that failure to arrest will
leave a battered woman in an unprotected position, with the batterer still
present and facing no restraints to stop him from beating her again.
See Note, supra note 33, at 799 (footnotes omitted).
193 See, e.g., McKee v. City of Rockwall, Tex., 877 F.2d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 1989)
(quoting affidavit with police chief's statement explaining non-arrest of batterer); see
supra note 143 and accompanying text.
194 See Note, supra note 33, at 795 ("In some cases, police may try to justify their
failure to arrest batterers as a waste of time and resources because battered women
often drop the charges against their assailants. Thus police may defend their policy as
substantially related to the important state interest of using limited resources most efficiently."). This commentator also noted:
Discriminatory intent can.., be shown by examining more closely
the police justification of "family privacy."...
[S]uch a rationale becomes suspect when it is used to justify state
inaction in the face of a battering situation. The willingness of police to
ignore both battering men's criminal behavior and battered women's
pleas for help demonstrate police intent to allow women to be harmed by
men. Such respect for male rule is a stereotype which harms women, and
provides evidence of discriminatory intent.
Id. at 800-01 (footnotes omitted).
195 See Note, supra note 33, at 799 n.49 (citing DEL MARTIN, BATrERED WIVES 14 (1st
ed. 1976) (showing statistics from several cities)).
196 See MARJORY D. FIELDS, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR POLICE FAILURE TO ARREST IN
DOMESriC VIOLENCE CASES (1987) (noting New York State police policy revisions requiring arrests in appropriate cases of domestic violence and responses addressing the criminal nature of domestic violence).
197 See, e.g., Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988); see
also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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19 8

These forms of evidence might also be proffered to support a
Stoneking (policy or custom) or Canton (failure to train) theory of liability. 199 Battered women could argue that municipal policymakers'
deliberate indifference can be inferred from statistically evident disproportionate harm to battered women as a result of persistent unequal protection by police policies or inadequate police training.
4.

State Tort Law Claims

DeShaney endorsed state tort law as a legal avenue for plaintiffs
injured by state officers' failure to protect when under a stateimposed duty to do So. 2 0 0 Special relationships can exist between
certain individuals and the state which trigger affirmative duties of
protection cognizable under state tort law. 20 1 As the DeShaney Court

instructed, "[a] State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents
as it wishes." 20 2 The Court's endorsement should be a signal to battered women plaintiffs that a state tort action might provide a viable
alternative to section 1983 claims. In numerous cases, battered
women have been successful in bringing tort actions against police
2 03
in state courts.
In federal courts, however, battered women have achieved
mixed results when bringing pendent state tort claims in section
1983 actions. 20 4 For example, in Thurman v. City of Torrington,20 5 the
See Watson, 857 F.2d at 690.
See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (1989).
201 Id.; see, e.g., DeLong v. Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1982);
Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958).
202 DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1007.
203 See Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983); Barnes v. Nassau
County, No. 12433 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Tedesco v. Alaska, No. 4FA-81-593 (Alaska
1981); Doe v. City of Belleville, No. 81-5256 (Ill. 1981); Kubitschek v. Winnett, No.
8587 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1980); Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1979); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc.2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1978),
aff'd 70 A.D.2d 573, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979); Baker v. New York, 25 A.D.2d 770, 269
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966); Jones v. Herkimer, 51 Misc.2d 130, 272 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct.
1966)); see Note, supra note 33, at 805 n.74 (citing same cases).
204 Compare Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (exercising pendent jurisdiction over plaintiff's state tort claim against a police officer for
negligently failing to detain battering husband and reversing grant of sumnary judgment to defendants) with Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn.
1984) (declining to exercise jendent jurisdiction over plaintiff's state tort claim). The
Second Circuit in Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989) defined pendent
jurisdiction:
The modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction derives from United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966).
Gibbs established that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear claims
under state law whenever (1) there is a claim arising under the constitu198

199
200
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district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state tort claim. The court reasoned that it wished to
avoid" 'needless decisions of state law ... as a matter of comity and
to promote justice between the parties.' ",206 The court, in its dis-

cretion, emphasized two jury-related issues weighing against pendent jurisdiction. First, the Thurman court anticipated jury
confusion with different standards and burdens of proof for liability
under the state statute and section 1983.207 Second, the Thurman
court expressed concern with potential jury prejudice against other
police defendants if the jury became aware of the city's indemnitor
208
obligation to pay for any damages assessed against them.
Courts declining pendent jurisdiction of state tort claims impose a barrier to the advantages of a federal forum. 20 9 In Miller v.
Lovett,2 10 the Second Circuit recently found that a district court
abused its discretion in declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction

over state tort claims in a section 1983 action. 211 The Second Circuit noted the principles favoring federal pendent jurisdiction of
tion or federal laws; (2) the relationship between the federal claim and
the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action comprises
but one constitutional case; (3) the federal claim has substance sufficient
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court; and (4) the state and
federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
...

Gibbs was ...

a response to the "hesitancy of federal courts to

recognize jurisdiction over state-law claims," and was intended "not only
to clarify, but also to broaden, the scope of federal pendent jurisdiction."
Id. at 1071 (citations omitted) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343 (1988)).
205 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
206
207
208

Id. at 1531.
Id.
Id.

209 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. While section 1983 contains no limitations on recovery, state tort claims acts often place a cap on recovery and do not provide

for punitive damages. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-4 (Burns 1986); Wis. STAT.

ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 1983). State legislatures may also impose a barrier to a federal
forum. See David E. Beller & Carolyn A. Quattrocki, Maryland's Tort Claims Act Grants
Limited Remedy, 22 MD. Bj.,July/Aug. 1989, at 17 (discussing such limitations as a 180day notice-of-claim requirement, cap on damages, no pendent or diversity jurisdiction
for tort claims act lawsuit in federal court due to immunity provisions, percentage caps
on attorney's fees for settlements and judgments under Maryland's Tort Claims Act,
MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (1984 & 1988 Supp.)); see also Comment, supra note 5, 1067 n.93. This commentator observed:
The purpose of [section 1983] was to provide a federal cause of action
and a federal forum for citizens who suffer a "deprivation" of their constitutional rights. It is irrelevant to this purpose whether the states may
provide some form of alternative remedy; the statute grants plaintiffs access to a federal forum in which to bring their claims if they choose to
avail themselves of it.
Id. (citation omitted).
210 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989).
211 Id. at 1068. The Second Circuit rejected the district court's cursory rationale for
dismissing the state claims: "Courts in this district have repeatedly discouraged pendent
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state-law claims in cases presenting federal questions: "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, '2 12 and "the interrelationship between state-law claims and questions of federal policy." 2 1 3 Finding the district court's dismissal of the state tort claims
perfunctory in light of these principles,2 14 the Second Circuit
remanded the case for reinstatement of the plaintiff's state-law
21 5
claims.
Given the recovery advantages of a federal forum for battered
women plaintiffs and the strong rationales favoring federal pendent
jurisdiction, federal courts should willingly entertain state tort
claims in the domestic violence context. The close interrelationship
between the federal constitutional harms that battered women suffer
and the injuries they sustain as a result of police negligence and inaction cognizable under state tort law outweighs federalism ratio2 16
nales in the context of a national problem in need of reform.
Battered women who face formidable burdens for establishing
actionable claims under section 1983 may consider bringing state
constitutional claims, in addition to tort claims, in state courts.
Many state constitutions provide more expansive protections to individual rights than the federal constitution.2 1 7 State constitutional
claims
police
212
213
214
215
216

in section 1983 litigation." Id. at 1073. The plaintiff brought this action against
officers who used excessive force during an arrest. Id.
Id. at 1071 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)).
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Consider the following national statistics:
Every 15 seconds a woman is beaten. (FBI statistics).
Three to four million women per year are battered. (National
Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence).
Thirty percent of all female homicide victims are killed by their husbands as opposed to six percent of all male homicides. (1986 FBI
statistics).
Men commit 95% of all assaults on spouses. Five percent of the cases
are committed by women against men. (National Crime Survey Data
from 1973-77).
A greater number of women are treated in emergency rooms as a result of wife/partner battering than the number of women treated for
rapes, automobile accidents, and muggings combined. (National Center
for Disease Control).
Statistics obtained from Massachusetts Coalition of Battered Women's Service Groups,
Boston, Mass.
217 Noting a trend of "new judicial federalism" whereby state courts are "bas[ing]
the protection of individual rights on independent interpretations of state constitutional
rights rather than U.S. constitutional rights," one commentator observed:
Where a provision in a state [constitution] is the same as, or similar
to, a provision of the U.S. Bill of Rights, a state court may interpret the
state provision more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the
U.S. provision ....
State courts may also . . .giv[e] an independent interpretation to a
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claims may indeed become an increasingly important avenue for recovery given recent limiting interpretations of federal constitutional
2 18
rights by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court in DeShaney signalled the foredosure of battered women's due process claims by narrowing the special relationship doctrine, the Court left other avenues open. As
suggested in Part III, battered women should actively pursue these
avenues. In particular, these plaintiffs may make more promising
section 1983 claims by alleging municipal liability under a "failure
to train" theory or a "policy or custom" theory. The future viability
of equal protection claims alleging gender discrimination requires
that courts accept extreme disparate impact as an evidentiary means
of inferring discriminatory intent against women. The courts' refusal to accept such evidence of intent may well render the burdens
of summary judgment for battered women plaintiffs impossible to
bear. Alternatively, state courts may provide a more hospitable forum for redressing violations of battered women's rights under state
constitutional and tort law.
Laura S. Harper

state constitutional right that is not found in the U.S. Constitution. For

example, 18 state constitutions explicitly prohibit gender discrimination....
Most state constitutions contain some rights that are not found explicitly in the U.S. Constitution. Among these are rights to.. . "individual dignity," . . . [and] victims' rights.
John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State Constitutions: The New
Judicial Federalism, 61 J. ST. GOV'T, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 163-64.
218 See id. at 165. This commentator noted:

[S]ince 1970, state high courts have issued more than 400 rulings in
which they have either granted broader rights protections under state
constitutions than the U.S. Supreme Court has granted under the U.S.
Constitution, or based their rights protection decisions entirely on state
constitutional grounds.
The most commonly cited reason for state high court activism in individual rights protection is the perceived conservatism of the U.S.
Supreme Court under Chief Justices Warren E. Burger and William H.
Rehnquist.

